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Will the WNBA Stay Afloat?
Madeleine Roglich ‘18
The Women’s National Basketball 
Association (WNBA) was formed in 1996 
and began play in June of 1997 after it was 
approved by the National Basketball Asso­
ciation (NBA) Board of Governors.1 In the 
mind of the Board, the new league would 
be a great venture for the NBA: NBA ex­
ecutives were tapping into the previously 
unexplored market that was professional 
women’s basketball in the U.S, where more 
and more women were playing sports such 
as basketball.2 However, the WNBA lasted 
3 seasons before it already found itself sur­
rounded by red ink.3 Yet this trend seemed 
poised to turn around, for keen observers 
of the WNBA’s marketability acknowl­
edged a burgeoning pool of prospective 
fans. Specifically, “the growing popularity 
of women’s college basketball, as well as 
the growing number of women who have 
played sports, [had] helped create an audi­
ence that didn’t exist in the league’s early 
years.’’4 Unfortunately, this reversal of for­
tune has not materialized, as the league’s 
business struggles continue even today.
To begin, the WNBA has encountered 
stagnant attendance at its games.5 This 
problem has now perhaps even worsened, 
as the 2015 season featured the lowest at­
tendance rate in the history of the league.6 
I believe that this trend can be partially ex­
plained by the WNBA’s struggles to keep 
fans engaged while they’re simultaneous­
ly attracted to competing sports leagues. 
As stated by sports reporter Eric Freeman,
Photo courtesy of The New York Times 
Even top WNBA players like Diana Taurasi 
earn less money to play in the WNBA 
than they do to play in other countries.
“becoming interested in the WNBA is not 
so simple as finding value in it. Enjoying 
the league [on a consistent basis] requires 
attention that many sports fans may already 
be giving to the NBA, the NFL, college 
football, and the other more established 
options.”7 Thus, unless a WNBA fan has a 
vested interest in, or specific allegiance to, 
a certain team or a specific player, said fan 
may simply not attend games. The only way 
to attract such casual fans, then (and thus 
deviate their attention from other sports 
leagues) is to make the WNBA fan expe­
rience worthwhile and memorable. How­
ever, even a cursory observation of WNBA 
arenas across the country will tell you that 
the WNBA has not created such experienc­
es. For instance, compared to other sports 
leagues with more money, the WNBA does 
not have as many promotions, such as 
giveaways and in-game entertainment, for 
attendees.8 Without 
such extra engage­
ment, fans could 
reason that they are 
better off watching 
the game on TV or, 
even worse, watch­
ing highlights after­
wards. Furthermore, 
it is worth noting 
that low attendance 
could bring about 
an additional down­
ward pull on future 
attendance. Specifi­
cally, low fan turn­
out can undermine 
the energy and in­
tensity that sports fans revel when attend­
ing a sporting event, which could dissuade 
even more fans from coming to the games 
in the future.
In light of this, one may think that the 
WNBA could instead find popularity 
through the medium of television. How­
ever, TV has really not been helpful either 
in reaching fans, as the WNBA does not 
receive nearly as much coverage as other 
professional sports leagues. For example, 
according to a 2010 USC study, coverage 
of women’s sports has actually declined, 
with ESPN’s SportsCenter devoting less
airtime to women in 2009 (1.4 percent of 
all coverage) than it did a decade earlier 
(2.2 percent).9 This lack of coverage also 
extends beyond sports news shows to tele­
casts of live games. Specifically, “[only] 
30 live [WNBA] games [are] televised 
each season on ABC, ESPN, ESPN2, and 
WatchESPN.”10 In contrast, under the mas­
sive new TV agreement between the NBA 
and ESPN/Tumer to take effect at the start 
of the 2016-2017 NBA season, the NBA 
will have 164 nationally televised games 
annually.11 Although one may point out that 
the sheer difference in scope between these 
two leagues could explain this disparity, I 
assert that the disparity is still important 
to acknowledge because it illustrates the 
WNBA’s struggle for adequate exposure to 
sports fans.
The WNBA also currently suf­
fers from a “talent drain,” as some of the 
best players in the league 
have recently been find­
ing better opportunities 
abroad. For example, Di­
ana Taurasi, one of the 
best all-around players in 
the league, received $1.5 
million from her Russian 
team to sit out of the WN­
BA’s season this past sum­
mer. In contrast, ESPN re­
ports that she makes only 
$107,000 as a member 
of the WNBA’s Phoenix 
Mercury.12 Surely, no one 
would wisely turn down 
Diana’s olfer from the 
Russians. This issue of 
retaining top talent could actually destroy 
the WNBA’s fan base altogether, possibly 
alienating even the most passionate fans 
who count on the league to showcase the 
best women’s basketball in the world.
Despite all of these challenges, I would 
argue that the future is not necessarily 
pessimistic for the WNBA, for there are 
many things the league can do to stop the 
bleeding. To start, the league needs to be 
more proactive in creating higher levels 
of in-game entertainment and giveaways 
in order to attract fans to the league. As 
aforementioned, the WNBA is competing
low fan turnout 
can undermine the 
energy and intensity 
that sports fans 
revel when 
attending a sporting 
event, which could 
dissuade even more 
fans from coming to 
the games in the fu­
ture.”
4 Sports, Inc.
Photo courtesy of Dave Schilling/Vice.com
Such a plethora of empty seats is a common occurrence in arenas throughout the WNBA, a league struggling to attract fans to games.
with other sports leagues for the attention 
of sports fans and thus needs to provide 
as enjoyable an experience as possible for 
such fans. Second, in terms of media cov­
erage, the league must discover additional 
ways to get their content to their audience. 
For instance, paying for more games to 
be live-streamed is a legitimate possibil­
ity in this era of “cord-cutting.” Also, the 
league can try and partner with particular 
news stations to receive more primetime 
news coverage that vast amounts of people 
will see. Furthermore, expansion of social 
media is always a great way of reaching 
out to a younger, more active generation 
comprised of more female athletes than 
the past. Finally, the WNBA needs to find 
ways to increase salaries so that they could 
outcompete other women’s professional 
basketball leagues for top talent. It will ob­
viously not be easy to find the money for 
such drastic increases in salary, but prior­
itizing the issue can compel teams and the 
league to be innovative in uncovering new 
revenue streams. With such changes, I be­
lieve that the WNBA has a fighting chance 
to be financially successful in the long run.
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Out with the Old, in with the Youth:
Why MLB General Managers Should Build
TheirTeams Around Young Talent
Daniel Solomon ‘19
David Steams, the recently 
hired General Manager of the 
Milwaukee Brewers, has said 
that a franchise “can’t build a 
team through free agency[...] 
The trick is to develop a pro­
cess and a system that allows 
you to consistently generate 
that [prospect] pipeline, even as 
you are competitive at the Ma­
jor League level.”1 It is diffi­
cult to know when to invest in a 
Major League Baseball player. 
Players typically hit the open 
market after their peak years, 
fresh off putting up gaudy sta­
tistics. But in the modem day, 
when exorbitant contracts are 
annually handed out to the top 
free agents, I assert that general 
managers should put their focus 
on acquiring young talent.
It is well documented that 
player ability declines with 
age. According to a study by 
Mitchel Lichtman of Hardball 
Times, players 
peak between 
26 and 28 years 
old, and begin 
drastic declines 
at around 33 
years old.2 And 
yet such ravag­
es of the thirties 
are not limited to fringe play­
ers: even great players experi­
ence declines due to injury or 
production. Take, for example, 
Johnny Bench, who is arguably 
the greatest hitting catcher in 
baseball history -  an MVP, a 
leader on Cincinnati’s Big Red 
Machine, and a force behind the 
plate. Yet, like most players, he 
had two careers, one before the 
age of 30 and one after. In his 
age-29 season, Bench played in
142 games for the ninth time in 
his career. However, after his 
age-29 season, Bench never 
topped even 130 games played 
in a single season. By his age- 
34 season, his OPS+ (which 
measures a hitter’s production 
compared to the league average 
of 100) was 98.3 Similarly, on 
the mound, the great Roy Hall- 
aday experienced a decline. For 
a portion of his career, “Doc” 
was considered the best pitch­
er in baseball. He won two Cy 
Young Awards, started multiple 
All-Star games, and even threw 
a post-season no-hitter. He was 
so good that the Phillies chose 
to trade for him over retaining 
Cliff Lee, a man who nearly 
pitched them to a World Series 
title. However, although Halla- 
day was consistently dominant 
through his age-34 season, top­
ping 200 innings eight times 
and playing only two seasons 
with ERAs of over 4.00, Fa­
ther Time eventually (and per­
haps inevitably) 
caught up with him. 
Halladay was a be­
low average pitch­
er in his final two 
years: his ERA+ (a 
statistic that mea­
sures a pitcher’s 
b allpark -ad justed  
performance compared to that 
of the league average of 100) 
dropped to 90 and 55 in his fi­
nal two years respectively.4
Therefore, while teams can 
build success around a core of 
players, the key to maintain­
ing success is knowing how 
long to keep them. Signing all 
members of a dominant team to 
long-term contracts does more 
to damage a franchise’s abil­
ity to stay competitive than it
“It is well 
documented 
that player 
ability declines 
with age. ”
Photo courtesy of hngn.com 
David Stearns joins a bloc of MLB general managers that prefer 
building their teams around young talent.
helps. And it’s not only because 
of aging players’ declining pro­
duction: by investing heavily in 
older players, teams also limit 
their abilities to trade for pros­
pects, to promote young and 
talented players, and to sign 
other players to supplement a 
competitive core.
Recent historical examples 
illustrate the flaws in investing 
heavily in older players. Look 
no further than the Philadelphia 
Phillies, a team that finished 
last in the National League 
East for the second straight 
time this year after winning 
the World Series as recently 
as 2008. In that time span, the 
team’s core remained largely 
the same, with players such as 
Jimmy Rollins, Chase Utley, 
Ryan Howard, and Carlos Ruiz 
all playing on the team until as 
recently as 2014. The oldest of 
these players was just 29 during 
the Phillies’ championship run, 
and the team remained dom­
inant until 2011, when these 
players were all 31 or 32 years 
old. But after that, they simply 
broke down. Utley dealt with 
numerous back injuries. Ryan 
Howard infamously tore his 
Achilles tendon, which sapped 
his power and precluded him 
from even staying on the field 
for much of the past four years. 
Before getting traded to the 
Los Angeles Dodgers, Rollins 
had become a below-average 
hitter, with his batting average 
peaking at a paltry .252 since 
2011.5 Ruiz has also been a 
below-average hitter accord­
ing to OPS+ in two of the last 
three seasons.6 However, at the 
same time, their salaries have 
risen: Utley earned $15 million 
in his last year with the Phillies 
as opposed to the $7.5 million 
he earned in 2008,7 Howard 
earned $15 million more this 
past year than he did 7 years 
ago,8 Rollins was paid $5 mil­
lion more,9 and Ruiz (who was
6 Sports, Inc.
making the Major League minimum in 
2008) earned $8,500,000 in 2015.10 Clear­
ly, then, the Phillies have rewarded past be­
havior instead of paying their players based 
on expected future production. A dominant 
team rotted to the point where it is now a 
“cellar dweller,” desperately trying to re­
build its farm system and to develop a new 
core of players. Unfortunately for them, in 
an effort to build a contender, they’ve dealt 
away promising players such as Travis 
d’Amaud, Carlos Carrasco, Jonathan Sin­
gleton, and Jarred Cosart."
Instead, teams should model them­
selves after the St. Louis Cardinals and the 
Tampa Bay Rays. For the most part, these 
teams buy players’ 20s and let other teams 
buy their more expensive 30s. They are cal­
culated in whom they keep and whom they 
let go. And they make savvy trades that al­
low them to remain competitive. Take, for 
example, what the Cardinals did after their 
2011 championship. They let Albert Pu­
jols, their most valuable 
player and one of the best 
players in team history, 
leave via free agency. In­
stead of giving him $240 
million,12 they paid Yad- 
ier Molina $75 million 
over five years,13 pitcher 
Adam Wainwright $97.5 
million over five years14 
(a bargain compared to 
the 7 year, $210 million 
contract awarded to top 
pitching free agent Max Scherzer15), and 
they signed Allen Craig to an affordable 
and tradable five-year, $31 million con­
tract.16 When Craig’s production faltered, 
his contract gave the team the flexibili­
ty to trade him for John Lackey, who has 
proved to be a great addition to the Cardi­
nals’ pitching staff. When they needed a 
shortstop, the Cardinals’ lack of massive 
commitments allowed them to sign Johnny 
Peralta to a four-year deal. And, courtesy 
of their hesitancy to give big contracts, 
they haven’t blocked players with potential 
to contribute in the majors. Simply look 
at staples of their starting rotation: Carlos 
Martinez, Michael Wacha, Jaime Garcia, 
Lance Lynn, and Adam Wainwright are 
all productive homegrown players. Only 
Wainwright is older than 30. Following this 
method, the Cardinals have successfully 
reached the playoffs in six of the last sev­
en years, making it to the National League
Championship Series four times. This in­
cludes three straight years after their for­
mer superstar Pujols’s departure.
The Rays, meanwhile, have made a 
habit of trading players one or two years 
before free agency in order to capitalize on 
trade returns. Following the 2010 season, 
the Rays traded Matt Garza to the Cubs. As 
a result of the deal, they have Chris Archer, 
a pitcher who was a fringe contender for 
this year’s Cy Young Award and someone 
who has emerged as a true ace. They’ve 
also signed him to a contract that gives 
the team control though his age-33 season 
at no more than $8.25 million per year.17 
Additionally, the James Shields trade that 
netted them Wil Myers and the subsequent 
deal that brought in Steven Souza, Jr. were 
brilliant. The team managed to trade an ex­
pensive pitcher that would be impractical to 
include in their long-term budgetary plans 
(Shields) for a Rookie of the Year Award 
winner (Myers). Then, following a down 
season from Myers, they suc­
cessfully shipped him to San 
Diego in a deal that brought 
in an above-average defen­
sive outfielder with power at 
the plate and more controlla­
ble years than Myers (Sou­
za). By avoiding long-term 
deals, they haven’t had to 
pay a declining Carl Craw­
ford, Matt Garza, or Melvin 
Upton, Jr. All of these play­
ers are now burdens to their 
new teams. Furthermore, when the Rays 
do invest in long-term contracts, they do so 
at discounted rates. They bought out Evan 
Longoria’s 20s, and subsequently signed 
him to a relatively team-friendly six year, 
$100 million extension,18 an inexpensive 
rate for an elite third baseman. As a result 
of such strategies, the Rays have made the 
postseason in four of the last eight seasons, 
an incredible rate for a team in such a small 
market.
It’s not a perfect equation, but winning 
teams generally field players younger than 
30. According to Bo Mitchell of Sporting 
News, of the 26 World Series winners be­
tween 1986 and 2011, the average age by 
position was above 30 for only third base 
and designated hitter, the latter of which is 
often reserved for aging players no longer 
capable of effectively playing the field.19 
Yes, there are exceptions, such as the 2009 
Yankees, who were built largely on expen­
sive imports, and the 2013 Red Sox, who 
resembled more of a cluster of aging vet­
erans who all had highly productive cam­
paigns. But, for the most part, the evidence 
seems to indicate that baseball is a young 
man’s game. Most of the recent champions
-  the Giants and the Cardinals, specifically
-  have been founded on homegrown talent. 
And this year’s champion was no different: 
the Kansas City Royals epitomize the con­
cept of building from the farm up. Thus, 
general managers should pay for a player’s 
rise, not his fall.
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Wins for Sale:
A Look at the Price of a Win in Major League Baseball
Sam Robiner ‘19
“Your goal shouldn’t be to buy players, 
your goal should be to buy wins. ” -  Jonah 
Hill/Peter Brand, Moneyball
A lot of things used to cost less. In 
1996, the year I was bom, you could buy 
a gallon of gas for $1.23, a dozen eggs for 
$1.31, and a year of tuition at an average 
four-year, private university for around 
$12,800.12 You could also buy a field-box 
ticket at Yankee Stadium for $25 to go 
watch a team that paid somewhere around 
$668,207 for each win.3,4
The majority of even avid baseball fans 
are probably not familiar with that last one, 
so let me back up a bit and explain what 
exactly that means and what exactly Jonah 
Hill meant by that Moneyball quote.
Since the 1962 season, the MLB sched­
ule has included 162 regular-season games 
for each team. The general goal for teams 
is to win around 89 or 90 of these games 
to qualify for one of the five (since 2012) 
playoff spots in each league.5
Where do these 89 or 90 wins come 
from? They come from the performance of 
players, who can be acquired in a variety 
of ways. Most often, they’re drafted and 
developed by the club, swapped as part of 
a trade, or signed to contracts in baseball’s 
closest approximation of a free market en­
vironment: free agency.
The current era of sabermetrics and sta­
tistics has brought about a paradigm shift 
in how general managers go about obtain­
ing these wins. Players are no longer seen 
primarily as a number of home runs, RBI, 
and stolen bases but as a quantitative mea­
surement of value in terms of the player’s 
contribution to scoring a run or earning a 
win. (There are thousands of articles on 
fangraphs.com and other sites about in­
teresting metrics like wOBA, UZR, and 
wRC+, but I promise to keep it relatively 
basic here.) One of the most important sta­
tistics for measuring player value is Wins 
Above Replacement (WAR).
In order to keep my promise, I’ll spare 
you the gory details of the dizzyingly com­
plex algorithms that calculate WAR and in­
stead skip ahead to the important part. Es­
sentially, WAR calculates how many wins a 
certain player’s performance is worth com­
pared to a minor league-level player that 
could be bought on the free market for the 
major league minimum salary ($507,500 in 
2015).6
One of the valuable things about WAR, 
at least in theory, is that it gives us the op­
portunity to compare the contributions of 
players regardless of their position or role. 
All the factors that would ordinarily make 
comparing a closer to a right fielder unfea­
sible are accounted for -  again, theoreti­
cally -  by WAR. Thanks to this tidy little 
metric, we can say confidently that closer 
Andrew Miller (2.0 WAR) was more valu­
able to the 2015 Yankees than right-field­
er Carlos Beltran (1.9 WAR). Awesome, 
right?
Now that we’ve established a universal 
system for comparing player performance, 
we can liken signing free agents to paying 
for an expected number of wins.
The first question to consider is what 
player cost-per-win data actually tells us.
It’s not necessarily a number that represents 
how much a given player deserves to be 
paid or how much a team should pay him. 
It’s certainly not meant as a predictor for 
how much a player is going to earn in free 
agency. Instead, as Dave Cameron writes, 
the question that cost-per-win answers is 
“how much would you expect to have to 
pay to replace this performance in free 
agency if you knew that you were going 
to get this level of value exactly?”7 Most 
importantly, it forces front offices to detach 
themselves from the medieval philosophy 
that they have to buy a particular type of 
player in order for them to be a good team.
Once teams embrace this idea, it opens 
up all sorts of possibilities in terms of ros­
ter construction, as GMs don’t have to re­
place lost WAR with identical production 
from a single player who happens to play 
the same position or hit in the same spot 
in the lineup. Instead, they can replace the 
lost production by shopping around for the 
best deals, allocating money however they 
want to try to restock their 25-man roster. 
The 2012 Cardinals provide a good exam-
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Some pundits erroneously claim that it is categorically unwise for teams to offer 
superstar players like Clayton Kershaw such exorbitant contracts.
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pie. After the Angels and their 
$254 million lured Albert Pujo­
ls, one of the greatest hitters of 
his generation and a perennial 
8-WAR contributor, Cards GM 
John Mozeliak had the opportu­
nity to reel in fellow power-hit­
ting free agent first baseman 
Prince Fielder. But Mozeliak, 
who has guided his team to the 
second-highest win total in all 
of baseball since he took over 
in 2008, looked beyond this 
simple substitution, preferring 
to replace Pujols’ WAR by sign­
ing Carlos Beltran to play right 
field and by locking up Yadier 
Molina behind the plate. The 
two combined for 9.4 WAR in 
2012 without the long-term risk 
of Pujols or Fielder.8
Sabermetricians in all 30 
MLB front offices have been 
searching for a philosophy that 
best capitalizes on the market 
inefficiencies of the game for 
some time now. One of the ma­
jor debates surrounding player 
cost-per-win is whether or not 
teams get as much bang for 
their buck by investing heavily 
in pricy superstars as they do by 
distributing cash more evenly 
among free agent signings.
There is some sentiment 
around the game that the Mi­
guel Cabreras, the Clayton Ker- 
shaws, and the Giancarlo Stan­
tons of the world are overpaid 
for their production due to the 
scarcity of their caliber of play­
er and the benefit of consolidat­
ing a massive amount of WAR
into a single roster spot. People 
who put stock in this will often 
pontificate that a six-win player 
costs more than three two-win 
players, so front offices can ex­
ploit this inefficiency by avoid­
ing these Stanton-esque mega­
deals.
Some of this makes a 
decent amount of logical sense, 
but, as Matt Swartz and Dave 
Cameron prove at length on 
FanGraphs.com, the data just 
doesn’t support the premise.910 
Yes, Clayton Kershaw has the 
richest contract ever given to 
a pitcher, by far. The Dodgers 
gave him $30 million this year. 
But there he was, leading the 
pack again with an 8.6 WAR." 
No matter how you calculate 
cost-per-win -  and there are 
plenty of ways to calculate 
it -  that production is actual­
ly a bargain at $30 million. 
Check out the data from Table 
1 below, compiled by Swartz, 
showing cost-per-win values 
of players in different contract 
tiers across multiple seasons.12 
The data supports the idea that 
superstars, in general, cash 
checks that are relatively rea­
sonable, proportional to their 
production. Evidence for this 
can be found in the far-right 
column, which shows that, be­
tween 2007 and 2011, players 
in the most expensive salary 
tier almost exactly matched the 
average cost-efficiency for all 
players. In fact, the worst deals 
seem to be for the mid-level,
$10-15 million players that 
are good but won’t get top-tier 
money or give top-tier produc­
tion. Bottom line: if you’re the 
Dodgers or the Yankees and 
you can swing long-term con­
tracts worth somewhere close 
to a quarter of a billion dollars, 
it can be worth the investment. 
Remember that statement when 
Mike Trout hits free agency in 
five years.
None 
of this 
is to say 
that teams 
s h o u l d  
start load­
ing up on 
$ 2 0 0 + 
m i l l i o n  
contracts, 
as that’s 
not al­
ways the 
right move for a team (Moze­
liak did just fine without Pujols 
or Fielder). However, no GM 
with a decent amount of cash 
should categorically shun A-list 
free agents as bad investments.
I feel obligated to make a 
quick side note here about the 
accuracy of specific cost-per- 
win (CPW) values: for a variety 
of reasons, the actual numbers 
should be taken with a grain of 
salt. Different methods of cal­
culating CPW vary so drastical­
ly that the numbers themselves 
should only be used to make 
comparisons, such as the chart 
displayed below, within one 
method of calculation.
Another important note to 
make is the distinction between 
individual player cost-per-win 
and entire teams’ cost-per-win. 
The reason I’ve focused more 
on player CPW until now is that 
it’s much more useful for front 
offices to try to build a team 
by piecing together individu­
al players’ production. When 
a GM looks at a prospective 
free agent signing, his job is 
to evaluate whether that indi­
vidual player is a cost-efficient 
addition to his existing roster. 
On the other hand, cost-per-win 
on an entire team basis comes 
into play more for FanGraphs 
and ESPN writers to comment 
on a GM’s performance or on 
general salary trends around the 
league.
With that said, as far as 
teams go, there are no real sur­
prises about which teams have 
the lowest cost- 
per-win numbers. 
For example, the 
2015 Astros were 
the second-thrift­
iest team in the 
league, spend­
ing $71,951,200 
on their 86-win, 
p l a y o f f - b o u n d  
team.13’14 Also, 
this was not a 
team that won 
because of its richest play­
ers: the top 52% of that pay­
roll accounted for only 14% 
of the team’s WAR.15 Instead, 
players like George Springer 
($512,900/3.7 WAR), Car­
los Correa ($507,500/3.3 
WAR), and Dallas Keuchel 
($524,500/6.1 WAR) provided 
Houston tons of astoundingly 
cheap production.16
This is possible because the 
MLB compensation system is 
designed for young players to 
be grossly underpaid. The Col­
lective Bargaining Agreement 
between the owners and players 
stipulates that most players ar­
en’t afforded the opportunity to 
freely negotiate with all teams 
on the open market until they 
have spent six years in the big 
leagues. Therefore, it’s ideal to 
be able to stock up on pre-free 
agency talent, like the Astros 
and Royals, to maximize the 
amount of highly cost-effi­
cient production on your roster. 
Surely, the more Carlos Correas 
you have, the more easily you 
can afford to make mistakes 
like the Astros, who paid Scott
Groups 
of FA- 
eligible 
Players
2007
$/WAR
2008
$/WAR
2009
$/WAR
2010
$/WAR
2011
S/WAR
2007-
11
$/WAR
All $4.9 $5.4 $5.6 $5.1 $6.1 $5.4
>$15MM $4.1 $5.2 $5.9 $6.1 $6.3 $5.6
$10
15MM $4.7 $5.7 $6.9 $8.2 $11.4 $6.5
$5-
10MM $5.9 $6.5 $5.3 $3.9 $4.8 $5.2
S0-5MM $4.5 $4.1 $3.6 $2.6 $3.4 ! $3.6
Table 1
as far as teams 
go, there are 
no real
surprises about 
which teams have 
the lowest 
cost-per-win 
numbers.”
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Feldman $10 million for a single win above 
replacement.
As I briefly mentioned earlier, another 
application for team CPW data is to ana­
lyze general salary trends over the past 
several decades. Remember those 1996 
Yankees I mentioned? That team sport­
ed a $61,511,870 payroll.17 They had the 
highest cost-per-win and the highest to­
tal payroll in the MLB in 1996 (by more 
than 10%), despite 3.3 WAR in dirt-cheap 
production from a rookie shortstop named 
Derek Jeter.1819
Two decades later, these total payroll 
and team CPW numbers would rank far 
below the lowest in the league. Only the 
seven poorest teams fall short of nine-fig­
ure payrolls.20 Even if New York’s 1996 
value is adjusted for inflation, it’s still only 
a third of the 2015 Dodgers’ staggering 
$314,168,414 payroll.21
Graph 1 below, with player CPW data 
for free agent signings dating back to 1996, 
shows the trend.22
Forbes pins this massive spike in free 
agent money on a variety of factors, in­
cluding “baseball’s unmatched inventory 
of live, DVR-proof content, real estate de­
velopment around stadiums, higher profit­
ability (which reduces the need for capital 
calls), and the incredible success of Major 
League Baseball Advanced Media, the 
sports’ digital arm that is equally owned by 
the league’s 30 teams.”23 I would add that 
it’s also a result of baseball’s somewhat 
unique system of a relatively lenient lux­
ury tax on the most cash-flushed teams, as 
opposed to the more prevalent salary cap 
system, which sets a more strictly enforced 
limit on annual payrolls in other American 
sports.
In fact, some fans may be tempted to 
question, in a league that places no severe 
constraints on spending, whether it even 
matters if their team is good at finding wins 
below market value. After all, how many 
Yankee fans complained in 1996 when 
their exceedingly pricey team won the 
World Series? Probably none.
But even the GMs in large markets 
like L.A., New York, and Boston don’t ac­
tually get blank checks from their owners. 
All owners are businessmen, and, if I can 
generalize for a moment, all businessmen 
share a certain partiality for money. While 
it’s true that teams like Tampa Bay and 
Oakland may have to be a little craftier to 
extract their 89 wins from bargain-bin free 
agents and homegrown, dirt-cheap talent, 
the reality is that baseball operations staffs 
from coast to coast are ballooning in size, 
with the hopes of stretching each dollar all 
the way to a championship. Dollars may 
not be as stretchy as they were a couple of 
decades ago, but at least now we’re all ask­
ing the right questions about what it takes 
to buy a win.
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Final Destination: 
Los Angeles -
The Possibility 
of Relocation 
in the NFL
Stephen Driscoll ‘18 
•  -------
Since 1995, Los Angeles 
has been without a National 
Football League (NFL) fran­
chise. However, the future 
prospects of football in LA 
have suddenly changed, as the 
San Diego Chargers, St. Louis 
Rams, and Oakland Raiders are 
all considering relocation there. 
This begs the obvious question: 
why are all of these teams so 
eager to move to LA seemingly 
out of nowhere?
For all three of these teams, 
the desire for relocation stems 
from concerns over their cur­
rent stadiums. What compli­
cates the situation is that, in all 
three of these cities, the owner 
of the arena is not a compa­
ny but rather the city govern­
ment.1,2’3 This phenomenon 
could theoretically complicate 
stadium negotiations, for cities 
have a lot of reasons to be skep­
tical about stadium construc­
tion and renovation.
First, the sheer cost of the 
enterprise is surely daunting for 
cities. As an illustrative exam­
ple, the City of San Diego has 
for the last twenty years been 
unwilling to significantly ren­
ovate its current stadium, the 
48-year-old Qualcomm Stadi­
um, or build a new one for the 
simple reason that desired ren­
ovations would cost between 
$250 million and $353 million,
and a new stadium would cost 
upwards of $1 billion.4
Second, legislators may be 
unwilling to fund stadiums due 
to the debt the city (and its re­
spective county) usually incurs 
to fund the projects. For in­
stance, in March of 1996, the 
citizens of Hamilton County 
(Cincinnati) approved a half a 
percent increase on their sales 
tax to fund the building of a new 
football and baseball stadium 
for their teams, the Bengals and 
Reds respectively.5 Since then, 
the burden of these stadiums, 
financed primarily through 
public funds, has sunk the city 
under the proverbial mountain 
of debt. In 2015, for example, 
Hamilton County spent around 
$53 million on servicing the 
stadium debt and operating 
costs.6 These costs represented 
around 6% of expenditures for 
the county, a significant propor­
tion for something that numer­
ous economists agree produces 
no real economic benefit (i.e. 
most stadiums sit empty for 
large portions of the year, gen­
erate less return on investment 
than other projects, and, unlike 
other developments, saddle the 
city with debt for extended pe­
riods of time).7,8,9 For Hamilton 
County, the combination of this 
debt and a sluggish economy 
forced the county to, among 
other things, increase property 
taxes, sell off a hospital, and
Photo courtesy of sportstechie.net 
Although Qualcomm Stadium needs some major renovations, the 
City of San Diego has been hesitant to provide the necessary funds.
reduce a planned tax rebate to 
close the budget gap.
Finally, the reluctance to 
build a new stadium is only 
compounded when the city/ 
county government has not 
yet relinquished its debt from 
a prior stadium investment, as 
is the case in Alameda County 
(Oakland), which still holds 
debt from a stadium renovation 
in 1997.'°
However, these doubts are 
still usually resolved, for, after 
weighing all such costs, many 
cities do end up providing 
significant public funding for 
sports stadiums." The reason 
cities pay for these stadiums 
is largely twofold. First, there 
is surely a set of incentives for 
state and city governments to 
try to bring a team to their area 
and keep it there. Americans 
love sports, and their politicians 
enjoy the prestige that a sports 
f r a n c h i s e  
b r i n g s . 12 
Most impor­
tantly, poli­
ticians fear 
the potential 
b a c k l a s h  
against them 
if the team 
were to relo­
cate because 
of a govern­
ment refusal 
to provide funds for an arena. 
Second, a city may be inter­
ested in building a stadium in 
order to revitalize a struggling 
neighborhood of the city/coun- 
ty. Many cities, such as Cincin­
nati, Baltimore, and Los Ange­
les, have used sports complexes 
as centerpieces of redevelop­
ment plans targeted at specific 
neighborhoods.5,1314
Therefore, it seems that the 
Chargers, Raiders, and Rams 
would have a lot of leverage 
in negotiations with their re­
spective cities over publicly 
funded stadiums. Each of these 
teams is on a year-to-year ba­
sis with their respective leases, 
allowing them, as the current 
tenants, the opportunity to ne­
gotiate for concessions such 
as stadium renovations and 
replacements in their current 
cities. At the same time, with 
the inherent flexibility of the 
current year-to-year contracts, 
the teams may also consider 
moving to a different 
city altogether.151617 
As articulated in the 
last paragraph, the 
threat to relocate 
could in turn hold a 
lot of weight in ne­
gotiations with cities 
intent on appeasing 
their sports-loving 
inhabitants.
In fact, such pre­
dictable acquiescence 
from host cities has occurred in 
the case of the Rams, as the city
“For all three of 
these teams, the 
desire for 
relocation 
stems from 
concerns over 
their current 
stadiums. 99
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of St. Louis has offered over $388 million 
of public funding for the Rams’ stadium.18 
However, the Rams apparently view the 
advantages of moving to LA as more fi­
nancially lucrative than the lure of public 
money. First and foremost, the Rams have 
made a proposal calling for the construc­
tion of multi-use developments in Ingle­
wood, CA, which may signal a new era of 
stadium construction.1419’20’21 The Rams 
owner, Stan Kroenke, has partnered with 
Stockbridge Capital Group, the primary 
developer of the adjacent 238-acre Hol­
lywood Park, to propose a massive com­
plex with the stadium as the draw.22 This 
development will feature the construction 
of homes, office buildings, malls, and oth­
er facilities to complement the stadium.20 
Building in this way would allow for the 
team, in the words of Stanford economist 
Roger Noll, to “ ...be embedded in larger 
commercial and residential projects, with 
the sports team being like an anchor tenant 
at a shopping center.”21 In addition to this 
bold sports complex, the Rams are surely 
also intrigued by various advantages of the 
LA market in general, such as greater na­
tional media coverage, a larger market for 
sponsorships and naming rights, and great­
er stadium revenue from events other than 
football games.23-24
Meanwhile, the Chargers and Raiders 
have surprisingly dealt with the unwill­
ingness of San Diego and Oakland respec­
tively to provide enough public funding 
(or, in Oakland’s case, any public funding) 
to build new stadiums. Apparently, these 
cities are cognizant of the various disad­
vantages of funding stadiums that were 
discussed earlier in this article. But, re­
gardless of the reasons, it is clear that this 
is a problem for the two franchises, for it 
is city funding that makes their current sta­
diums profitable in otherwise unprofitable 
markets.24 Specifically, when the city funds 
stadium construction and assumes owner­
ship of that stadium, it ends up completely 
subsidizing the costs of running the stadi­
um while conceding 100% of the revenue 
generated during the football games, the 
most profitable events, to the team.25 Thus, 
LA is an especially intriguing alternative: 
it offers the potential for a profitable new 
stadium even without subsidization from 
the Los Angeles government. Again, as 
aforementioned, the LA market is lucrative 
in and of itself.
In conclusion, these possible moves to 
LA are all still theoretical until they receive 
NFL approval. Thus, there is still time for 
the situations in all of these cities to resolve 
themselves.25 However, with talks in all 
three cities seemingly stalled, I would ar­
gue that it is becoming increasingly likely 
that football will return to LA in the very 
near future.
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The NBA's New Fashion Statement:
Corporate Logos on Uniforms?
Ben Gershenfeld ‘19
The four major sports 
leagues in America -  Major 
League Baseball (MLB), the 
National Basketball Asso­
ciation (NBA), the National 
Football League (NFL), and 
the National Hockey League 
(NHL) -  have proven to be the 
top leagues in the world in their 
respective sports. And yet, all 
four of these leagues are still 
looking for new ways to max­
imize profits. For instance, 
America’s sports have looked 
to expand their brands globally. 
The MLB frequently kicks off 
its season with a two-game se­
ries in Tokyo, Japan or Sydney, 
Australia. The NFL has plans in 
place to play games each year 
in England until at least 2020. 
The NBA held its first NBA 
Africa Game this past summer 
in an effort to showcase the 
game’s talent in other areas 
of the world. The NHL has a 
strong hold on the international
market, with 77.6% of its play­
ers coming from countries oth­
er than America.1
However, despite Ameri­
can sports’ global influence, 
international sports have not 
adhered to the American sports 
tradition in one blatant regard- 
namely, corporate sponsors on 
uniforms. Interestingly, it seems 
that America has been the one 
to conform within this context. 
Specifically, smaller American 
leagues like the NBA Develop­
ment League (D-League), the 
Women’s National Basketball 
Association (WNBA), and Ma­
jor League Soccer (MLS) have 
already incorporated ads onto 
their uniforms.
And now, the NBA has 
become the first major Amer­
ican sports league to put plans 
in place to join the rest of the 
world in this surprisingly lucra­
tive revenue stream. In the new 
NBA television deal that will 
go into effect in 2017 -  a deal 
that pays the NBA $24 billion
over nine years from both Turn­
er Sports and ESPN -  there are 
plans for how to split the mon­
ey generated from sponsor ads 
on uniforms, a step that Com­
missioner Adam Silver calls 
“inevitable.”2
However, the move has met 
staunch criticism from scores of 
people who are afraid that the 
game will 
become too 
co r p o r a t e  
and lose its 
traditional 
feel. As the 
N a t i o n a l  
Basketball 
Association 
has worked 
itself into 
the fabric 
of Amer­
ican history and culture, the 
images often associated with 
the game involve the jerseys 
of the league’s great players 
and organizations. Michael Jor­
dan’s red and white #23 Bulls
jersey, Magic Johnson’s purple 
and gold #32 Lakers jersey, and 
Larry Bird donning his Celtic 
green and white #33 jersey are 
iconic examples of such imag­
es. Many people, even those 
close to the business operations 
of the league, are against the 
decision to “take away from the 
authenticity of the uniform.”3 
Larry Miller, 
who current­
ly serves as 
president for 
the Jordan 
brand and is 
the former 
president of 
the Portland 
Trail Blaz­
ers, is not 
only worried 
about losing 
the authentic feeling of the jer­
sey and the game overall but 
is also afraid of hurting teams 
in smaller markets.4 According 
to Sports Illustrated, teams in 
small markets like the Memphis
the move has met 
staunch criticism 
from scores of 
people who are afraid 
that the game 
will become too 
corporate and lose 
its traditional feel.”
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NBA jerseys could soon resemble this brand-clad FC Barcelona uniform worn by soccer legend Lionel Messi.
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Grizzlies and Mil­
waukee Bucks would 
only bring in about 
$800,000, but teams 
in large media mar­
kets like the Los An­
geles Lakers and New 
York Knicks could 
add up to $10 million 
to their bottom lines.5 
This would further the 
financial gap between 
franchises and would 
thus perhaps exacer­
bate the well-docu­
mented relative lack 
of parity in the NBA (in the last 15 years, 
there have been 7 different teams to win an 
NBA championship, compared to 9 in the 
NFL, 10 in the MLB, and 10 in the NHL).
In response to such concerns, NBA 
Deputy Commissioner (and Cornell grad) 
Mark Tatum assures fans of the game that 
the NBA will not rush into this big decision 
and that it will work because it is “widely 
accepted around the world.”6 In an effort 
to avoid penalizing small-market teams, 
the NBA will try to nationalize all of the 
advertisements instead of localizing them 
and creating variability between markets.7 
And with just the sheer amount of revenue 
that the NBA could potentially gain, it is 
hard to turn down. Forbes reports that the 
NBA could make around $100 million in 
revenue per year from corporate ads on 
uniforms.8 With an estimated 450 play­
ers in the league, each player on average 
would generate $222,222 for the NBA,9 an 
amount certainly worth the small company 
name on a jersey.
However, how can the NBA convince 
critics that the uniforms won’t lose their au­
thenticity? According to Adam Silver, fans 
of the game won’t even notice the ads. To 
prove this, he points to instances in the past 
where players wore ads on their jerseys 
with little to no flak from such critics. For 
example, he stated: “During the slam dunk 
competition on Saturday night of All-Star 
Weekend, all the contestants were wearing 
a Sprite logo on their jersey. It was fasci­
nating to me it got almost no attention.”10
I am inclined to agree with the Com­
missioner’s arguments, for these ads will 
surely not be comparable to NASCAR uni­
forms, which are covered in logos. Instead, 
there will likely just be a patch near the 
shoulder of the jersey, a small price for a
big reward.
Corporate advertise­
ments have progressively 
become a part of sports. It is 
impossible to go ten minutes 
through a televised sport­
ing event without a slew 
of commercials. Baseball 
outfield fences and hockey 
walls are tattooed with slo­
gans and logos. It is thus not 
far-fetched to believe that 
uniforms will be the next 
destination for these logos. 
And when the NBA exe­
cutes its plans, I don’t think 
it’s crazy to presume that other sports will 
follow shortly thereafter. Calgary Flames 
president Brian Burke concurs that this de­
velopment is imminent in the NHL, and he 
does not like that prospect: “It’s sickening. 
I hate it. I hate it.”11
Well, in contrast, I personally don’t 
think it looks too bad at all. Imagine.. .“Qa­
tar Airways” and “Fly Emirates” on the 
chests of Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ron­
aldo respectively,...“Coca-Cola” on LeB- 
ron James’ shoulder,...“Ford” on Alexan­
der Ovechkin’s chest,...a golden arch next 
to Tom Brady’s Patriot logo...“Visa” next 
to the globally recognized Yankee logo...
“Baseball outfield 
fences and hockey 
walls are tattooed 
with slogans and 
logos. It is thus 
not far-fetched to 
believe that 
uniforms will be the 
next destination for 
these logos. ”
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The NHL's Fork in the Road:
Sin City or Quebec City
Photo courtesy of globalnews.ca
The recent completion of the Videotron Centre, a state-of-the-art facility, is one reason why 
Quebec City could be a very feasible destination for NHL expansion.
Natalie Allen ‘19
The day the NHL hockey season ends 
in mid-June is a sad one for hockey fans 
around the globe. The long 4-month break 
before a new season begins seems like an 
eternity as the hockey world slows down 
and the NHL-promoted hashtag #IsItOc- 
toberYet? becomes ever more palpable. To 
some hockey fans’ delight, the NHL had a 
busy summer as it took big steps in the ex­
pansion process to possibly create a new 
team by the 2017-2018 season.
This expansion process features three 
distinct phases. The first phase swiftly 
passed as Las Vegas and Quebec City 
were the only two cities, out of a pool of 
16, to have their applications for expansion 
approved by the NHL. Prospective Las 
Vegas team owner Bill Foley and the Que- 
becor, the force responsible for the bid in 
Quebec City, were the only two able and 
willing to put up the required $10 million 
down payment ($2 million of which is non­
refundable).1
Phase two consisted of the two bid­
ders providing the league with informa­
tion regarding their projected markets and 
arena plans. A major factor that influenced 
whether or not cities made a bid for creat­
ing a team was if they could build an are­
na before a decision on expansion would 
be made.1 The publicly funded, recently 
built, 18,259-seat arena, Videotron Centre, 
would be the hock­
ey home for Que­
bec City’s team. 
The Montreal Ca­
nadiern and Pitts­
burgh Penguins 
recently wore in 
the arena during an exhibition match as a 
preview of what the arena would look like 
in full force.2 Meanwhile, the Las Vegas 
Arena is currently under construction, and 
its projected completion date is April of 
2016.3
The third phase is currently underway
as representatives from both cities make 
their pitches for expansion to the NHL’s 
executive committee.4 These pitches are of 
critical importance as they detail each city’s 
specific business proposal, “from how they 
will pay the expected $500 million expan­
sion fee to the ways they’ll manage and ex­
ploit possible revenue streams.”5
As we wait for the third phase to un­
fold, let’s play the role of the NHL and 
weigh the pros and cons of these two possi­
ble destinations.
On the one hand, Quebec City’s brand 
new, high-tech rink, already worn in by a 
sellout crowd, suggests that Quebec City 
is ready and prepared for a team and will 
have no difficulty filling seats. Fans, long 
estranged from the Quebec Nordiques, 
their past hometown hockey team that 
was relocated to Denver in 1995, filled the 
stands during the exhibition match between 
the Penguins and Canadiens in desperate 
hope that hockey will soon return.2
“Nice atmosphere, beautiful arena, that
Quebec City 
must acknowledge 
the issue of the 
rising Canadian
dollar.”
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was a lot of fun,” Canadiens center David 
Deshamais (who grew up around Quebec 
City and is one of many natives who hope 
to see hockey return to their hometown) 
said.2 Proponents of expansion, such as 
Habs coach Michel Therrien, believe Que­
bec City itself will drive the team to suc­
cess as it is “a city that has a lot of passion 
for hockey.”2
However, despite such optimism, Que­
bec City must acknowledge the issue of the 
rising Canadian dollar. The Canadian loo- 
nie “is on a downward trajectory against the 
American dollar,” which has raised ques­
tions regarding the drastic financial impact 
of a new Canadian team.5 Not only would 
the $500 million expansion fee equate to 
more than $671 million in Canadian dol­
lars, but the exchange rate may also “have 
a crippling effect on [a Canadian team’s] 
ability to pay salaries, which are due to 
players in American Funds.”5 In spite of 
such concerns, former Canadian Prime 
Minister and Quebecor VP Brian Mulroney 
has no doubt in his mind that Quebec City 
“can handle the team.”4 It is now up to the 
NHL to decide if they believe Mulroney 
that a new Quebec City team would be a
successful addition to the league.
On the other hand, Las Vegas seems to 
be lagging behind, as its arena is still under 
construction. However, this may not be a 
concern, for the city held a season-ticket 
drive where 13,500 season-ticket commit­
ments were secured.4 Surely, prospective 
owner Bill Foley has not been discouraged, 
claiming that there are passionate hockey 
fans in Las Vegas that have “clearly demon­
strated that ‘Vegas Wants Hockey!’”4
Nevertheless, although the season-tick­
et drive showed great promise for a hock­
ey market, the NHL executive committee 
must decide whether or not Las Vegas can 
sustain a fan base for a hockey team. Ques­
tions have been raised by NHL executives 
and fans around the league regarding the 
“established hockey culture in the area.”5 
There is also concern as to whether or not 
hockey can compete for a market with the 
city’s already established entertainment in­
dustry. Specifically, Las Vegas is a massive 
tourist city, which has resulted in the city 
facing rejection “by major league sports in 
the past because of the pervasive presence 
of gambling in the city and concerns about 
the local economy.”5
Faced with weighing the advantages 
and disadvantages of both cities, the NHL 
is not likely to make a decision until the 
next owners’ meeting, which is set to take 
place in December.2 With many questions 
still left unanswered, it is possible that a 
decision could be pushed back even fur­
ther until after the 2015-2016 season. If so, 
hockey lovers would have another exciting 
and eventful summer to look forward to.
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The Las Vegas Strip, an epicenter of gambling, epitomizes why some people question whether Las Vegas could ever be a legitimate home
for a major sports franchise.
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The Story of Dude Perfect:
Redefining What it Means to be a 
Professional Athlete
Photo courtesy of Yahoo News
The members of Dude Perfect (from left to right): Coby Cotton, Garrett Hilbert, Cody Jones, Tyler Toney, and Cory Cotton.
Jamie H ill‘18
They don’t play organized 
professional sports. They don’t 
have uniforms. They don’t play 
games on national television. 
And yet, they make millions 
of dollars for playing sports 
and have athletic endorsements 
just like Peyton Manning, Ti­
ger Woods, and LeBron James. 
Who on earth could I possibly 
be referring to? The answer: 
Dude Perfect, a group that is 
redefining what it means to be 
a star in the sports in­
dustry.
If you have heard 
of Dude Perfect, then 
you understand the 
magnitude of its brand.
For those of you who 
are unfamiliar, I’ll give 
you a rundown. Dude 
Perfect is a group of 
five buddies who start­
ed making trick-shot 
videos in college when
they bet a sandwich to see who 
could one-up the other guys. 
They realized what they were 
doing was pretty cool and 
started uploading the videos to 
YouTube. Starting with simple 
backyard hoops, the guys have 
augmented their act, which 
now features incredible basket­
ball shots from the third deck of 
a football stadium, the catwalk 
in an arena, and even from an 
airplane. They’ve thrown base­
balls through the windows of a 
moving car, kicked a field goal 
through the 
uprights and 
into a bas­
ketball hoop, 
maneuvered 
p i n g - p o n g  
balls through 
an incredi­
ble obstacle 
course, and 
so much 
more. They 
seem to have
done it all. Fast-forward 6 Vi 
years from their college days, 
154 uploads, 1 billion views, 
and 7 million subscribers later,' 
and they’ve turned their home 
videos and a bet on a sandwich 
into an Internet sensation.
The guys have been fea­
tured on Jimmy Kimmel, Good 
Morning America, Regis and 
Kelly, CBS Evening News, 
Fox and Friends, and the ES- 
PY’s and were nominated for 
a Teen Choice Award. They’ve 
expanded their brand past just 
videos to include iPhone apps, 
clothes, phone cases, mugs, 
and a book to reach a net worth 
north of $5 million.2 They’ve 
even collaborated with people 
in the sports world, from indi­
viduals such as Tyler Seguin, 
Johnny Manziel, Ryan Tanne- 
hill, and Dale Earnhardt Jr. to 
entire teams like the Seattle Se- 
ahawks.
So how exactly did a bunch 
of college guys turn a home­
made video into a multi-million 
dollar company?
To start, partnerships with 
various companies, a major part 
of the group’s business strategy, 
has been crucial for Dude Per­
fect’s success. For example, 
one of Dude Perfect’s major 
partnerships is with Whistle 
Sports, which is a media com­
pany that connects sports to all 
social media platforms. The 
Whistle aids in production of 
Dude Perfect’s videos and pro­
motes such videos across mul­
tiple platforms. Following the 
union, Dude Perfect’s base of 
subscribers increased from 2.2 
million to 7 million and con­
tinues to grow.3 Other fruitful 
corporate partners include Fiat, 
which closed down an airport 
to create a video combining its 
car’s stunts and Dude Perfect’s 
trick shots.
Furthermore, Dude Per­
fect has been able to capitalize 
on the entertainment aspect
they’ve 
turned their 
home videos 
and a bet 
on a sandwich 
into an 
Internet 
sensation.”
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“Dude Perfect is 
able to position 
itself as a group of 
“normal” people 
who are more 
relatable to sports 
fans than 
superstar 
athletes are. ”
of the sports industry. The guys produce 
high-quality and fun content that appeals 
to a broad demographic and allows them to 
dominate this niche of sports. Dude Perfect 
targets sports fans and provides a unique 
alternative to traditional games and sport­
ing events. They’ve also transitioned into 
comedy with their series of “Stereotypes” 
videos, expanding their influence on enter­
tainment and furthering their appeal.
Dude Perfect is able to position itself 
as a group of “normal” people who are 
more relatable to sports fans than superstar 
athletes are. As Whistle Sports executive 
vice president Brian Selander said: “They 
serve as an inspiration to athletes all over 
the world. They say, ‘You don’t have to be
in the middle of the stadium to have tens 
of thousands of cheering fans.’ With your 
own camera, and your own backyard, you 
can become somebody who attracts fans all 
over the globe.”4
Dude Perfect is surely more than just 
YouTube videos, t-shirts, and interviews: 
they’ve become an important addition to 
the sports landscape. Not every young ath­
lete or sports fan can be as good as LeBron 
James, but these guys have become a new 
type of inspiration. They’re regular guys 
that have managed to make it big doing 
what they love. In addition, they have not 
only brought themselves success but have 
also managed to carve out a whole new 
niche in the sports industry. An impressive 
legacy for five buddies with a camera!
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Legal Concerns in the Booming Industry 
of Daily Fantasy Sports
u
Damian O’Sullivan ‘17
•  ■ •
Advertisements for daily fantasy 
sports (DFS) gambling are becoming in­
creasingly hard to miss when watching 
televised sporting events. The industry 
has become incredibly profitable in recent 
years, raking in over $1 billion in entry fees 
from over 1.5 million 
Americans in 2014.'
FanDuel and Draft- 
Kings are now mas­
sive in scope, receiv­
ing investments from, 
or forming sponsor­
ship deals with, the 
NBA, MLB, and 28 
of the 32 NFL teams.2 
However, in the wake 
of such financial suc­
cess, the industry has 
come under legal in­
vestigation for their 
practices. This devel­
opment illuminates important legal ques­
tions about the increasingly widespread 
and profitable industry and contributes to
al i ty
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... critics point 
out that DFS 
features all of 
the fundamental 
elements of 
traditional 
gambling: 
a consideration, 
a prize, 
and chance.”
the discussion over the le- 
and morality of sports 
in general.
To begin, sports bet­
ting in general has been 
a hot topic o f \  
debate since 
the passage of the Profes­
sional and Amateur Sports Pro­
tection Act of 1992 (PASPA), 
which prohibited such betting 
in all but four states. In response 
to this piece of legislation, two 
opposing schools of thought on 
sports betting have materialized. 
On the one 
hand, pro- 
p o n e n t s  
of the law 
point out
the social costs of gambling in
!T®n
tfcm fD u e l
general (e.g. increased crime rates, unem­
ployment rates, suicide rates, and other so­
cial issues associated with gambling addic­
tion). In addition, even when considering 
the tax revenues that would ostensibly be 
aised through legalized sports bet- 
ing, PASPA advocates estimate that, 
, (Tor every dollar brought in by gam­
b lin g  revenues, states would spend 
hree dollars addressing the aforemen­
tioned social costs of gambling.3 The 
NFL, MLB, NHL, and NCAA also sym­
pathize with this position, citing the need 
to maintain the integrity of sports and even 
supporting a motion to expand the ban to 
remove the Nevada loophole.4 On the other 
hand, opponents to PASPA contend that, in 
spite of these claims reflecting the ills of 
sports gambling, an $80- 
380 billion illegal sports 
gambling enterprise exists 
(although reliable figures 
are admittedly difficult to 
estimate because it is an illegal industry)5
Photo courtesy of CBS Sports
NBA Commissioner Adam Silver advocates for the legalization of sports gambling to ensure the regulation of a currently illegal
multibillion-dollar operation.
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New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman's cease and desist order to DFS companies 
illuminates doubts about the legality of daily fantasy sports.
and operates primarily through offshore 
websites and underground bookmaking op­
erations. In other words, the efforts to pre­
vent sports gambling have not only failed 
to do so but have also forced these dealings 
into an unreg­
ulated mar­
ket in which 
criminal en­
terprises profit 
much like Pro­
hibition did 
with alcohol 
in the 1920s.
Instead, NBA 
Commissioner 
Adam Silver 
suggests that 
legalizing the industry and allowing it to 
be effectively monitored would not only 
protect gamblers from theft and other harm 
but would bolster the integrity of the game 
through measures such as monitoring un­
usual line movements, licensing gamblers 
to ensure standards, verifying age, exclud­
ing gambling addicts, and educating con­
sumers on responsible gambling.6
DFS had for a while managed to evade this 
debate, for the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act, which prohibits forms of 
online gambling including poker and sports 
betting, makes a special exemption for fan­
tasy sports. The law characterizes fantasy 
sports as a realm in which “winning out­
comes reflect the relative knowledge and
skill of the participants and are determined 
predominantly by accumulated statistical 
results of the performance of individuals 
in multiple real world sporting or other 
events.”7 Thus, according to the law, DFS 
cannot be considered gambling because 
it requires a greater degree of skill and 
reliance on statistics than betting pure­
ly on the outcomes of games. However, 
critiques of this exemption have recent­
ly brought DFS under legal scrutiny. 
For example, critics point out that DFS 
features all of the fundamental elements 
of traditional gambling: a consideration, 
a prize, and chance.8 In addition, poker 
offers a persuasive counterexample to 
DFS as a game that is considered gam­
bling even though, like DFS, it involves 
skills that could provide a competitive 
advantage. With such logic, the Nevada 
Gaming Board determined that DFS is in 
fact gambling and needs to be regulated 
as such. New York Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman recently agreed and issued a 
cease and desist order to DFS companies 
for engaging in illegal gambling. This de­
cision issued a massive blow to the DFS 
industry by removing their revenues from 
New Yorkers, and it remains to be seen if 
other state courts will see likewise in the 
future.
DFS has not only been questioned 
for its characterization as a form of legal 
betting but also for the nature of its daily 
operations. Specifically, the Department
“Such allegations 
illuminate 
the notion 
that DFS sites 
must be 
regulated if 
they remain 
legalized.”
of Justice and FBI are currently investigat­
ing allegations that a DraftKings employ­
ee used insider information regarding the 
rates at which players were getting drafted 
in order to turn a $25 entry fee on rival site 
FanDuel into a whopping $350,000 payout. 
Such allegations illuminate the notion that 
DFS sites must be regulated if they remain 
legalized. Otherwise, how would websites 
like DraftKings ensure that their employ­
ees behave honestly and maintain the integ­
rity of DFS?
As we can see, the recent media atten­
tion directed at DFS compels us to reflect 
and ask ourselves a lot of questions about 
sports betting and DFS in particular. Im­
pending legal proceedings will provide re­
vealing insight into what our legal system 
feels about such questions.
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